Saturday, July 14, 2007

ABL cited by Georgia Supreme Court

ABL turns one year old on July 22 and Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears gave ABL an early present by citing to ABL's article, You've Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51 Buffalo L.Rev. 337, 337 n. 1 (2003) in Georgia Pines Community Service Bd. v. Summerlin, 2007 WL 1880018, *6 .7 (Ga. 2007).

Although YGM is cited for a relatively minor point, it is cited by the Georgia Supreme Court! One down and forty-nine to go. ABL came close to citational stardom a few years ago when YGM was cited in a cert. brief to the USSC. PREWITT ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, Respondent., 2004 WL 1180851, *1180851+ (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (U.S. May 25, 2004) Petition for Writ of Certiorari (NO. 03-1592).

Tuesday, July 03, 2007

Waiting for Godot (to disclose expert witnesses)

I was asked the other day, what does "unreasonable" mean, which prompted the learned response -- "it depends." Judge Skretny recently provided some insight into what is not good cause (i.e., what is unreasonable) in terms of seeking to re-open discovery and extend the deadline for expert disclosure after 2 years (give or take).

What is not good cause? Waiting 2 years after the expiration of expert deadlines and 1.5 years after the close of discovery -- and over a year after a Magistrate Judge expressly ruled in court that expert disclosure deadlines had passed and the opportunity to disclose experts had been waived by the parties -- before first seeking leave to extend the deadline for expert disclosure. Judge Skretny ruled that under circumstances approximating those described above, no good cause was shown -- thus denying a motion to revise a scheduling order under Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

ABL successfully opposed plaintiff's request to re-open discovery and disclose an economist that was purportedly not disclosed earlier because plaintiff wanted to "wait and see" what happened with defendant's summary judgment motion before incurring the expense of an expert. The Court noted that plaintiff's "decision to be in for a penny, rather than a pound" was a "strategic gamble [that she] must now live with."